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SOME CAVEATS CONCERNING DNA AS
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE:
WITH THANKS TO THE REVEREND
BAYES
Richard Lempert*
INTRODUCTION

The conference panel at which this paper was originally
presented was structured along the lines of a debate. The three speakers who were supposed to advocate the use of DNA evidence were
labeled, as is customary, Proponents. But those who were supposed to
take the negative side were not called Opponents. Rather they were
labeled Caveators. I do not know who is responsible for this label,'
but I think it gets things exactly right. To my mind anyone considering DNA as criminal identification evidence should be a Caveator.
The promise and utility of DNA analysis in identifying the perpetrators of such serious crimes as rape and homicide must be acknowledged, but one must also be aware of the limits of the DNA
identification process as it now exists and the ways in which these
limits affect what experts can reliably tell judges and jurors. In particular, I shall argue below that current practices may lead to misleading
claims for reasons that to date have not been fully appreciated by the
forensic science community. In making some of these arguments I
shall use the Bayesian perspective which Finkelstein and Fairley 2 long
ago posited as a paradigm for thinking about identification evidence.
Although the forensic use of DNA to identify criminals is in this
country less than five years old, the law review literature is already
replete with articles discussing the technology.' Many of these arti* Francis A. Allen Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A., 1964,
Oberlin College; J.D., 1968, Ph.D., 1972, University of Michigan. Work on this paper was
supported by the Cook funds of the University of Michigan Law School. I especially thank
Ian Evett and William Thompson who commented helpfully on the initial version of this paper
and who provided me with material that was of great aid as I revised. This version of the
paper is, however, very different from the version they saw, and there is no reason to expect
that they would agree with everything I have written. I am also grateful to Sam Gross and
Larry Kramer for their helpful comments on this manuscript.
I I assume Peter Tillers who organized the conference is responsible for the label, but I
never went so far as to ask him.
2 Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1970).
3 See, e.g., Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing. Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic
Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REv. 45 (1989); Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unrelia-
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cles include detailed descriptions of how identification by DNA
matching proceeds. Thus I see no reason to be similarly detailed
here.' I should note, however, that while some of my comments apble Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465 (1990) (authored
by J.C. Hoeffel) [hereinafter, Note, DNA Profiling]; Note, DNA Typing: A Rush to Judgment,
24 GA. L. REV. 669 (1990) [hereinafter Note, DNA Typing].
4 The custom in law review writing is to assume no knowledge on the part of the reader
and to build every argument from the ground up, even if that ground has been plowed many
times before. It is a custom that has wasted numbers of trees. Contrary to custom, I assume
that most of my readers are already familiar with the basic mechanisms and criticisms of DNA
identification, for my purpose is not to educate readers in an unfamiliar technology, but to
push an ongoing discussion further. Those who are not well acquainted with DNA identification in its forensic context may wish to peruse other articles examining DNA identification
evidence before turning to this one. One article which gives an especially good overview of the
technology and raises many of the most basic criticisms that have been raised against these
procedures is Thompson & Ford, supra note 3.
For those readers who have not yet looked at the literature on DNA identification but
nonetheless wish to read on, the following, without pretending to be an adequate explanation
of the technology of DNA analysis, is all that one must know to understand the arguments in
this paper.
A typical DNA identification proceed§ by comparing DNA left at the crime scene (extracted from the evidence DNA sample-most commonly semen) with DNA known to belong
to the suspect (extracted from the suspect DNA sample-most commonly blood taken from a
suspect). The DNA taken from the two samples is cut into fragments at particular places
(loci) by restriction enzymes and these restriction fragments, called RFLPs (restriction fragment length polymorphisms) or alleles (one of two or more forms of a gene at a gene locus) are
compared by measuring their length. This measurement is done by placing the DNA in a gel
and running an electric current through the gel. This causes the negatively charged DNA to
migrate through the gel, but the larger the allele the slower the migration process. Thus when
the current is turned off, shorter strands of DNA will have moved farther than longer ones.
These differences in movement can be observed by comparing the locations of what may be
described as fuzzy lines (or, sometimes more accurately, elongated blobs) called bands on an
autoradiogram, or autorad for short. (For the purposes of this paper, one need not know how
the bands were made to appear on the autorad.)
If the alleles from the evidence and suspect samples are genetically the same, they will be
the same length, which is to say they will have moved the same distance, plus or minus measurement error. This identity will ordinarily be revealed on the autorad because the bands in a
column (lane) that represents evidence DNA will be at the same location (that is, the same
distance from the bottom of the autorad) as the bands in a column that represents the suspect
DNA. If the alleles are different, they are likely to be of different lengths, but it may be impossible to distinguish two different alleles because they may be so close in size that the observed
differences in length could plausibly be attributed to the errors that might occur in twice measuring identical alleles. In other words, different size alleles may appear to be located at virtually the same point (give or take measurement error) on the autorad.
If the alleles from the evidence and the suspect sample are the same length one must know
to what degree this incriminates the suspect. This depends on how many people are likely to
have apparently identical alleles at the places examined. If 90% of all people have identical
DNA at a particular locus, the fact that a suspect's DNA matches a rapist's DNA does little to
inculpate the suspect. If on the other hand, only one percent of all people have DNA at a
particular locus, the fact that a suspect's DNA matches the evidence DNA at that locus carries
substantial incriminatory weight.
The judgment about how rare different-sized alleles are is made by looking at the frequency of different alleles in a more general population. Laboratories that measure different
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ply more broadly, I have in mind only the current dominant technology, RFLP analysis using single locus probes with Southern blotting.
I.

PROPER STATISTICS

DNA identification evidence is ordinarily presented to the fact
finder' as the fact that a sample of a defendant's DNA 6 matches or
does not match an evidence sample and, if it matches, the probability
that an individual randomly selected from a population would have
DNA matching the evidence sample. In the United States, experts
typically give this probability in frequentist terms; for example, "there
is one chance in fifty thousand that a randomly selected Caucasian
alleles will each have done population studies in which the length of the different alleles that
may be found at the loci of interest will have been measured for a sample of at least several
hundred individuals. Indeed, typically several such population studies will have been done,
usually one for Caucasians, one for Blacks, and one for Hispanics. The suspect's race will
determine which population base is used to indicate allele frequencies. In cases where the
suspect DNA matches the evidence DNA, the proportion of the population sample with the
same alleles will determine the incriminatory weight of the evidence.
Because different alleles may be inherited from each parent, there will often be two different alleles at a loci, and since a typical DNA identification may examine alleles at four loci
there may be as many as eight opportunities for the evidence and suspect DNA to match. If
there are no test or measurement problems, the suspect cannot be the source of the evidence
DNA unless all alleles tested match up. Thus if an allele or alleles at a single loci do not match
up, and if the failure cannot be attributed to some condition of the test or measurement, the
suspect cannot be the source of the DNA found at the crime scene. If, on the other hand,
there is a perfect match, this fact may or may not have substantial incriminatory value. The
degree of incriminatory value depends on the proportion of people in the appropriate population who have the same configuration of alleles (i.e., a joint distribution of alleles) across the
loci that have been examined. However, given the size of available population samples, it is
likely that when four loci have been studied no one in the population sample will have exactly
the same allele configuration as that found in the suspect and evidence samples. Thus, the
probability of the joint distribution must be estimated from the frequency of individual alleles
in the population sample. Typically this is done by assuming that each identified allele exists
independently of the existence of each of the other identified alleles. This means that the
probability of a particular distribution of alleles may be calculated by multiplying together the
probabilities that each individual allele will be found. The assumption of allelic independence
is, however, not justified in a world where people do not mate at random, (see sources cited
supra note 3; infra note 9) although there is considerable dispute over what the failure of this
assumption implies (see sources cited infra note 76). In cases where suspect DNA matches
evidence DNA, prosecution experts who assume allelic independence and multiply individual
probabilities have estimated likelihoods of one in fifty billion and less that a randomly selected
person would have DNA matching the DNA found at a crime scene and upon analysis of the
suspect's blood.
5 The fact finder may be a judge or a jury, and even when the jury is the fact finder the
judge too must find facts, for he/she must determine whether the jury's fact finding, in the case
of a guilty verdict or any verdict in a civil case, is reasonable enough to be allowed to stand.
Nevertheless, I shall assume for purposes of exposition that the fact finder is a jury.
6 I will assume it is the defendant's DNA that is being assessed. The DNA sample might,
of course, come from someone who is not a suspect, the boyfriend of a rape victim, for
example.
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male would have the same DNA profile as that found in both the
evidence sample and the sample taken from the defendant." This frequentist probability does not, however, directly answer the question
that confronts the jury, which is not how unusual is the DNA profile
in question, but how likely is it that the evidence sample is that of the
defendant? The answer to this question will turn, even in the frequentist world, on the size of the population of potential suspects. Unfortunately, the careless presentation of evidence, either by an expert
witness or by a prosecutor summarizing the expert's testimony for the
jury, may make it look as if the question of the rareness of the evidence DNA profile and the probability that the'defendant's matching
DNA is the source of the evidence profile are identical. To continue
with the above example, the jury may be led to believe that the import
of the DNA evidence is that there is only one chance in fifty thousand
that the evidence DNA came from someone other than the defendant.7 This is known as the "prosecutor's fallacy." And even if this
7 Thompson & Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials, 11
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987).
For an example in a case involving a DNA identification, consider the following colloquy
between judge and expert in a Frye hearing in the case of People v. Johnson, No. A 998 149
(Los Angeles Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 1990). The expert is a molecular biologist who worked for
Celmark Diagnostics, one of the private laboratories that has been a leader in moving DNA
identifications from the laboratory to the courtroom. The issue in the case is somewhat atypical. The question concerned the identity of a missing man, whom the police believed had been
murdered by the defendant. To establish identity the state sought to show through DNA
testing that blood flakes found in the defendant's van belonged to the missing father of someone whom I will call X. X's father was believed to have been the defendant's accomplice in a
robbery.
Prosecutor: As a result of the testing you've done in this case, what is your answer?
Is it that the testing shows that the blood flakes are consistent with being
the biological father of the son, that is [X], or that in fact the blood
flakes as a result of your testing and in your opinion do represent the
biological father of [X]?
Witness:
In my professional opinion, the biological relationship between [X] and
the blood flakes is a true and accurate one. The data I say is consistent;
however, that is what-in my professional opinion there, is a biological
relationship there.

The Court:

Does that mean it's consistent with his being a father or it's 100 percent
certain that he is the father?
Witness:
In my opinion that he is the father.
The Court: That the flake is the father of [X]?
Witness:
Yes.
The Court: Because you compared [X's] blood with [X's mother's] blood and the
flake's blood?
Witness:
Yes.
The Court: Okay. I apologize. I misunderstood your answer.
Record at 309-10, Johnson.
In fact, the judge understood the limits of what the witness could say on the basis of the
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misinterpretation is not offered to the jury, the jury on its own may
make this mistaken equation.
Proper weighing of evidence by the jury requires a proper understanding of what the evidence imports. To achieve this a court must
carefully monitor the way in which statistics are presented and interpreted by both expert witnesses and counsel. Instructions on the
meaning of the evidence and a defense counsel adept at explaining
how the evidence relates to the question the jury must answer (i.e.,
"how likely is it that the defendant is the source of the evidence
DNA?") may also be necessary if a jury is to properly weigh the evidence it is given.'
If the defendant's DNA matches the evidence DNA, the question of how likely it is that the defendant is the source of the evidence
DNA turns on the composition of the population of suspects. Thus it
is clear that assumptions about the distribution and independence of
alleles in the reference population used to evaluate the probability of a
DNA match is crucial. It is now well recognized that due to population substructure, standard population data bases may not adequately
represent the relative frequencies of polymorphic alleles in specific
subpopulations. 9 Thus data bases consisting of American Blacks
might not adequately assess the likelihood that the evidence DNA
profile would characterize a randomly selected West Indian Black
when the defendant whose DNA matches the evidence DNA is a
West Indian. Similar arguments may be made about extending analyses from Hispanic data bases to, for example, Cubans or generalized

Caucasian data bases to Sicilians.10
DNA tests better than the witness did. All the witness could properly say is that the DNA
extracted from the blood flake was consistent with the source of the flake being the father of X
and that there was a certain chance (in this case 1 in 220, Record at 314) that a randomly
drawn individual would have had alleles at the loci tested consistent with fatherhood. The
expert, however, says that the paternal relationship is certain given a four allele match!
8 Instructions and explanations might not be crucial where the probability that a random
individual possesses the DNA profile in question is very low, such as one in ten billion. But
while probabilities of this magnitude have been offered in litigation, current statistical data
bases and the current status of the assumptions that alleles are independently and randomly
distributed in data base populations are insufficient to support estimates of such magnitudes
given the number of alleles ordinarily evaluated.
9 See, e.g., Cohen, DNA Fingerprintingfor Forensic Identification: Potential Effects on
Data Interpretationof Subpopulation Heterogeneity and Band Number Variability, 46 AM. J.
HUM. GENETICS 358 (1990); Lander, Population Genetic Considerationsin the Forensic Use of
DNA Typing, in BANBURY REPORT 32: DNA TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 1436 (J.
Ballantyne, G. Sensabaugh & J. Witkowski eds. 1989); cf Barbujani & Sokal, Genetic Population Structure of Italy. II. Physical and Cultural Barriersto Gene Flow, 48 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 398 (1991).
10 Whether subpopulation data matters depends on the population substructure of the data
base and suspect populations. See infra notes 20-21 and the text accompanying notes 16-21.
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Juries are not, however, in a good position to evaluate the
problems posed by such subpopulations in their weighing of evidence.
While a jury can appreciate the fact that it may be improper to apply
statistics based on population data to members of a distinct subpopulation, there is little that a jury can do rationally to weigh the implications of this fact because with only population data the jurors have no
basis for estimating the probative value of a match. Rather the problem must be resolved at the level of the standards that are set for
qualifying experts, for population data bases, and for appropriate conservatism in making statistical estimates.
A.

The Problem of Micro Populations

While considerable attention has been paid to problems posed by
subpopulations that may not be homologous with the population of
which they are a part, virtually no attention has been paid to the problem posed by "micro populations"; that is, the group of brothers, sisters, cousins, aunts, uncles, parents, and children who reside in the
same general area as the defendant and who might be possible sources
of the evidence DNA. For example, in a tour of one DNA laboratory
I saw one autorad in which there was a perfect match except for two
clearly disparate alleles, which resulted in an absolute exclusion. The
DNA analyst reported that he sent a message back to the prosecutor
who had submitted the sample that the defendant should be freed and
his brother arrested.
Presumably if a brother had been arrested and his DNA matched
the evidence DNA perfectly, the expert would have been willing to
testify to some high degree of probability that the DNA could not
have come from some randomly selected individual, and the jury
would have been invited to infer that this meant that there was a high
likelihood that the new defendant was the source of the evidence
DNA. But in recommending that a brother be arrested, the expert
never drew the prosecutor's attention to a crucial question; namely,
how many brothers did the defendant have? If the defendant had ten
brothers, the likelihood might be quite high that more than one would
match the evidence DNA perfectly. Cousins, children, parents and
other close relatives would raise still further the probability that there
was at least one other person in the vicinity who was not excluded as
a suspect by the DNA evidence, meaning that the probability that
someone other than the defendant was the source of the evidence
The estimated probability that a random individual might be responsible for the evidence
DNA is likely to be higher if the data base used to make this evaluation is composed of individuals who are ethnically of the same subpopulation as the defendant.
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DNA might have been as high as one in two or one in three or some
other similar number. If the matter is called to their attention, juries
might be able to understand the import of the fact that there are untested close relatives who are potential suspects, but they cannot properly weigh the implications of this possibility unless the scientific
community pays some attention to the question of what the presence
of micro populations of close relatives means when interpreting DNA
evidence for forensic purposes.
Ian Evett, who is to my knowledge the only forensic scientist to
have formally addressed the matter, ' acknowledges the potential seriousness of the problem. He posits, by way of example, a situation
where finding a match between evidence and suspect DNA leads to a
two hundredfold increase in the estimated odds of a defendant's guilt.
This increase (which may be thought of as the evidentiary weight of
the match) diminishes to less than two percent of its original value if
the defendant's brother is a plausible suspect. 2 Evett, with typical
British understatement, notes that "Non-scientists [read "jurors"]
might not be aware that such changes [in the weight of the evidence]
are possible."' 3 One might add that scientists, especially forensic
scientists testifying to the weight that should be given DNA matches,
seem not to be aware of this either; at least I have encountered no
reported case in this country where a prosecution's expert discounted
the evidentiary weight of a DNA match because of the possibility that
a relative might have left the sample.
While this micro population issue most obviously arises when the
defendant claims that the perpetrator was his brother or some other
relative, it in fact exists in almost every case. For it is the state's
responsibility to ensure that its expert's estimate of the weight to be
placed on a match is based on appropriate population statistics. This
is part of what it means to have a presumption of innocence and to
place the burden of proof on the state."' In other words, before introducing any sort of statistical identification evidence, it is the prosecutor's obligation to identify the appropriate population base for the
I' See I. Evett, Evaluating DNA Profiles in a Case Where the Defense Is "It Was My
Brother," (rev. ed. Sept. 1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with Cardozo Law Review; to
be published in 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. Soc'y - (1991) (forthcoming)).
12 I. Evett, supra note 11, at 5-6.
13 Id. at 6.
14 The burden of proof is on the state in two senses. First the state bears the risk of nonpersuasion in that if the jury is not persuaded of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, it should acquit. Second, the state has the production burden or the burden of presenting enough evidence to allow a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In meeting this
burden the state may not present testimony that it knows to be false and must base any scientific evidence it offers on a scientifically appropriate foundation.
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statistical comparison."5 Thus it is the prosecutor's obligation from
the outset to specify in a scientifically justifiable way what that population is. If a brother or other relative is a member of that population,
an expert's opinion of the probability that the DNA came from someone other than the defendant should take account of this fact.
The population that should be used to interpret the evidentiary
implications of a DNA match is the population ofpotential suspects,
which I will call the "suspect population"; that is, the group of people
who might have committed the offense if the defendant is not guilty.
Members of the suspect population will typically be those people who
are in a position to have committed the offense (predominantly people
who live close enough to the crime scene to have been there at the
time of the crime)"6 as limited by other known facts that might screen
the population potentially subject to DNA testing. If, for example, a
killer had only one leg, only people who might have been present at
the crime scene and are missing a leg would be members of the suspect population, for before the state went to the expense of testing a
person's DNA they would check to be sure he had only one leg. Or,
to be less fanciful, if a raped woman did not know whether her assailant were white or black because she was assaulted from behind and
then blindfolded, the suspect population would consist of the population of people, white and black, who could have been present at the
time and place of the assault. The appropriate data base for evaluating the weight to be placed on a match, would be a data base which
mixed white and black cases in proportion to their presence in the
suspect population. 17 Conversely, if the victim had identified her rapist as white, the appropriate data base for evaluating a match would
be a data base composed entirely of men who appeared to be white,
since the police would not arrest and test a man who appeared to be
black in these circumstances.
DNA experts never use data drawn from the suspect population
15 See, e.g., People v. Collins, 60 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
16 Some other people may also be members of this population. For example, a tourist who
was in the area of the crime at the time is a member of the population of suspects though he
may not be in the area at the time the crime is investigated and no one may appreciate that he
is a suspect. For most purposes such people may be ignored in deriving appropriate population statistics. In some cases, such as mob hit men, who may frequently be from out of town,
or high level drug distributors, people who reside outside of the area of the crime cannot be
ignored and, indeed, are not ignored in police investigations.
17 I am putting aside for the moment issues of population substructure. In fact the appropriate data base to evaluate the meaning of a match would consist not just of similar proportions of caucasians and blacks but within each group would mimic the distribution of inbred
ethnic groups (e.g., Poles, West Indians) within the suspect population.
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to evaluate the implications of a match. 8 Rather they use data from
the same convenience samples as a base against which to evaluate all
the DNA tests they conduct. This is justified by the claim that the
DNA alleles evaluated are "unexpressed"' 9 and so should be distributed in one group (the group used to construct the data base) with a
frequency that is no different, after accounting for sampling error,
than the frequency with which it is found in another group (the suspect population). This assumption is typically qualified in one way.
The data base used to determine the probability of a random match is
composed of people of the same gross ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic) as the defendant2° even though this limitation is appropriate
only when other available evidence limits the suspect population to
people of the defendant's ethnicity. 2 '
With this understanding of the suspect population, we can better
18 "Well," in the words of Captain Corcoran to his crew, "hardly ever." In a well-known
English case the police sought to test and largely succeeded in testing every male between the
ages of 13 and 30 living in an area where two rape murders had occurred. The case eventually
broke when one man confessed that he had provided a blood sample for another. The other's
blood was then tested and his DNA matched that of the rapist. See the article Regina v. Pitchfork, London Times, Jan. 23, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
19 Unexpressed DNA alleles have no known manifestations at any level above the DNA
and so could not affect survival rates or be used as a cue for mating.
20 To recognize this is to recognize population substructure as a factor which influences the
distribution of the alleles tested. However, crudely controlling for ethnicity along the most
salient socially defined lines fails to come to grips with the issue of population substructure
that is implicitly recognized. The broad social categories in which ethnicity is socially defined
do not define groups that are genetically homogenous. The distribution of alleles in a group of
people with Finnish ancestry may be quite different from the distribution of alleles found in a
group with a Lithuanian Jewish heritage, although we might label both Finns and Lithuanian
Jews Caucasians. Indeed, the allele distribution within one white ethnic group may be closer
to the allele distribution among ail American blacks than it is to the allele distribution within
some other white ethnic group. Moreover, there may even be structure to what we think of as
subpopulations. For example, Italians might be considered one of the subpopulations or ethnic
groups that make up the Caucasian population. But within contemporary Italy, population
substructure exists which follows linguistic and to a lesser extent geographic lines. Barbujani
& Sokal, supra note 9. Thus if a suspect population consisted largely of Sicilians, the estimated
probability that a randomly chosen member of that population would have a certain configuration of alleles might be off by orders of magnitude if the estimated allele frequencies were based
on an Italian rather than a Sicilian reference group.
21 Where the suspect population is not limited to people of one race, limiting the data base
sample to individuals of the defendant's gross ethnicity is conservative in the sense that it will
understate the weight of the evidence if the suspect's alleles are more commonly found in a
group that shares his ethnicity than in a group that has a different heritage. I do not, however,
think that this limitation exists because forensic experts seek to be conservative in the
probabilities they present (though they sometimes do). Rather I think this is done both because little thought is given to the proper definition of the suspect population and because it is
felt that juries will think it appropriate to compare individuals of one ethnicity with their "own
kind." If the latter is a reason, socially constructed ethnic categories serve well even if they are
incoherent from the point of view of population biology and genetics. For a discussion and an
example of how to estimate allele frequencies for a racially mixed subpopulation, see Walsh &
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understand the problems posed by brothers, cousins, fathers, and
other relatives. More often than not some relatives will be members
of the suspect population. Not only is a suspect likely to have relatives living in his vicinity, but the relatives are likely to be similar on
initial screening dimensions such as race. Thus if the state properly
defines the suspect population, however unlikely it is that a random
individual could have left DNA that matches both the suspect's and
the evidence DNA, the probability that a member of the suspect population could have left matching DNA will often be much higher because relatives tend both to belong to the suspect population and to
share alleles with the suspect.
The question is what to do about this. One solution is to live
with the fact that evidence 'of a DNA match is not nearly so probative
as people have thought because suspect populations are not random
agglomerations with respect to the likelihood of sharing the alleles
compared in DNA analysis. Totally apart from issues of population
substructure, the likely presence of a defendant's relatives in the suspect population means that there is a good possibility that another
potential suspect has DNA that matches the evidence DNA. Living
with this situation means telling juries in many instances that a DNA
match has only a moderate rather than a strong incriminatory implication. I expect, however, that this solution will strike many people
as inadequate. Their intuition will be that suggestions that "a brother
did it" will more often than not be a red herring which will improperly undercut the potential of DNA analysis to provide relatively unambiguous evidence of identity. It is an intuition I share.
A second solution is to ignore the presence of relatives in the
suspect population unless the defendant makes a plausible case that a
relative committed the crime. This solution, however, runs counter to
the general principle that the burden of proof is on the state and that
it is the state's burden to provide scientifically reliable estimates of the
likelihoods involved in DNA analysis regardless of the claims the defendant makes. Moreover, unless the defendant were provided with
the funds needed to conduct an in-depth criminal identification, he
will ordinarily be in no better position than the state to make a plausible case that a relative of his committed the crime of which he is
accused.
A third solution is for the state with the cooperation of the defendant2 2 to identify those relatives who belong in the suspect populaBuckleton, Calculatingthe Frequency of Occurence of a Blood Type for a "Random Man." 31
J. FORENSIC SCI. Soc'y 49 (1991).

22 If the defendant does not cooperate in identifying relatives, I think the state should be
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tion and for the state by examining their DNA to individually exclude
them as suspects. This is, in principle, a sound strategy, but in many
cases it will be expensive and inconvenient, with the further drawback
that the process of investigating relatives in connection with a serious
crime is likely to cast undue suspicion on numbers of innocent people.
Moreover, the best and most private way of excluding relatives as suspects, which is to analyze their DNA, will depend on the relatives'
cooperation since the mere fact of being related to the prime suspect
23
will not generate probable cause for such an intrusive search.
Guilty relatives as well as those who simply want to undercut the
state's case against the defendant are unlikely to consent to DNA
tests or even to cooperate in explaining their whereabouts at the time
of the crime in question.
A fourth solution is to ask how likely is it, given the non-DNA
evidence against the defendant and a DNA match, that a relative in
fact left the DNA. If it is unlikely, the practical solution is to ignore
the problems posed by relatives. In other words, if the non-DNA evidence in the case is strong (e.g., the defendant was caught by the police running from the scene of a rape, a footprint at the scene of the
assault matched the shoes he was wearing, etc.), the presence of relatives in the suspect population can be safely ignored because it is unlikely that the DNA left at the scene came from anyone other than the
defendant even if some relative's DNA matches the defendant's DNA
and the evidence sample at the crucial loci. However, this solution
means that DNA evidence will be reported as most weighty when it is
least necessary;24 i.e., when the other evidence standing alone is likely
allowed to infer that there are no such relatives or to treat the claim that a relative is in the
suspect population as waived.
23 Even without probable cause individuals may be required to produce certain information, including personal information, in response to a subpoena issued in connection with the
work of a grand jury. The leading case in this area is United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1
(1973), which held that the fourth amendment does not prevent a federal grand jury from
securing a voice exemplar from an individual without a showing of probable cause. In reaching this decision the Court wrote, "The required disclosure of a person's voice is thus immeasurably further removed from the Fourth Amendment protection than was the intrusion into
the body effected by the blood extraction in Schmerber." Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Even if
DNA may be acquired through a less intrusive technique than the extraction of blood (such as
the clipping of hair) the seizure of a DNA sample may still be different from acquiring a voice
sample in that a person has a reasonable expectation that information about his genetic make
up (unlike information about the sound of his voice or the color or texture of his hair) is
private. Whether this argument, if accepted, should apply to VNTRs, which are unexpressed
portions of the genome, is an issue I note here but shall not discuss.
24 Ignoring relatives will also mean that the statistic providing the probability that a random individual's DNA will match the evidence DNA is hypothetical, since we know the suspect population contains at least one nonrandom (with respect to DNA) individual-the
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to support a conviction.2" Moreover, other evidence that we often
think of as powerful may not have much probative value in this context. An eyewitness identification, for example, may suffer from the
same weakness as a DNA match. Just as a relative of a suspect is
more likely than a random individual to match that suspect's DNA,
so is he more likely to be similar in appearance. Similarity means that
an eyewitness presented with a lineup containing the innocent relative
but not the guilty one has a good chance of picking the innocent rela-

tive out of the lineup.26 Thus an eyewitness identification would be
insufficient reason to ignore possible relatives in establishing the
probability of a DNA match.
Finally, technology may resolve the problem. If the number of
sites tested (now usually three or four) is increased substantially, or if

forensic scientists are eventually able to sequence DNA rather than
merely measure approximately allele size, even the presence of close
relatives (so long as they are not identical twins) in the suspect population should not prevent the conclusion that a DNA match provides
overwhelming evidence that the suspect has been properly identified.
But until technology advances, the most honest approach is to present
the jury with the probability that a random individual left the evi-

dence DNA and the probability that it was left by one of the group of
defendant's relatives whom the state has not been able to exclude
from the suspect population.2 7
II.

A

BAYESIAN APPROACH TO THINKING ABOUT

DNA

Additional problems in the interpretation and presentation of
relative. We are, in effect, allowing an inappropriate statistic to be presented because we are
sure the defendant is guilty. See infra text accompanying notes 84-88.
25 When other evidence is strong, evidence of a DNA match is most likey to be reliable.
This is simply a particular instance of a general point. Incriminatory evidence of any type is
most likely to be valid when it is consistent with the other evidence in a case.
26 A number of studies suggest that in making lineup identifications eyewitnesses may mistakenly pick out the person in the lineup who is most similar in appearance to the person
actually observed. For example, an eyewitness who cannot remember any physical characteristics of a robber except that "he was rather good looking" may, when confronted with a
lineup simply pick out the best-looking person. Although there may be enough suspects in the
lineup so that the probability of picking out anyone by chance is not high, there is nothing
surprising about the witness's choice. Even people who never saw the crime are likely to pick
the same person if they are told the robber was "rather good looking." See, e.g., Doob &
Kirshenbaum, Bias in Police Lineups-PartialRemembering, 1 J. POL. SCI. & ADMIN. 287
(1973).
27 If the state attempts to show that relatives who are prima facie members of the suspect
population should be excluded because they could not have committed the crime in question,
the question arises to whose satisfaction must this be shown. I suggest that the judge make this
decision, but that regardless of the judge's decision a defendant be allowed to suggest a relative's guilt to the jury.
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DNA evidence arise, in part, because frequentist statistics are inherently unsuited to the forensic context.2"
As I have pointed out
above,2 9 the statistics usually presented to juries 30 are not directly related to the question that the jury must resolve, and the relationship
between the question the statistics can answer and the one the jury
must answer may be unclear or prone to confuse. Putting aside for
the moment the question of how statistical evidence should be
presented to the jury, it is clear, as Finkelstein and Fairley argue, that
the appropriate question, how much does a particular item of evidence increase the likelihood of the defendant's involvement in the

crime charged?-is posed for the jury when statistical evidence of
identification is presented in a Bayesian rather than a frequentist
framework.3 I Indeed, although evidence is presented in a frequentist

fashion, jurors may attempt to evaluate it in a Bayesian light. And
even if this is not true as a behavioral matter,32 it is how jurors should,

as a normative matter, assess the probative value of evidence.33 Thus,
Bayes' Theorem provides, at a minimum, a heuristic device which al28 1 am not saying that frequentist statistics should not be used in a forensic context nor
necessarily that the problems that inhere in them are severe. I wish simply to point to a
tension inherent in their use; the fact that, as I have already noted, see text accompanying
notes 6-7, frequentist statistics do not respond directly to the question that the fact finder must
resolve.
29 See supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
30 1 am referring to the frequentist statistics used by forensic scientists in the United States
to describe for juries the degree to which a DNA match incriminates a defendant. The information need not be presented to juries in this fashion. In Britain, Ian Evett, a research scientist attached to the Home Office, has suggested the possibility of evaluating the probative value
of DNA matches in a Bayesian perspective by constructing likelihood ratios. Under Evett's
proposed scheme a scientist would convey the evidentiary import of the evidence to the jury
not in numbers, but in ordinary English. The conventions he has most recently suggested for
translating likelihood ratios into words are:
Evidence Strength
Weak
Fair

Likelihood Ratio In the Range of:
1 - 33
33 - 100

Good

100-

Strong
Very Strong

330- 1000
1000+

330

See I. Evett, A Personal Odyssey 20 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (to
be published in THE USE OF STATISTICS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (C. Aitken & D. Stoney eds.,
forthcoming)). See also, Evett & Werrett, Bayesian Analysis of Single Locus DNA Profiles, in
PROCEEDINGS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN IDENTIFICATION

77

(1989).
31 Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2.
32 See Schum & Martin, Formaland EmpiricalResearch on CascadedInference in Jurisprudence, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 105 (1982).
33 See Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977).
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lows us to explore further issues relating to the proper weighing of
DNA identification evidence.
For our purposes Bayes' Theorem may be written as:
P( S)
OS
O(SIE) = P(Enot-S) . 0(S)
or, in English: the odds that the defendant is the source of the evidence sample, given the DNA evidence, equals the probability that
the DNA evidence would have had the characteristics it had if the
defendant were the source, divided by the probability that the DNA
evidence would have had the characteristics it had if the defendant
were not its source, multiplied by whatever odds one would have
given prior to the receipt of the DNA evidence that the defendant was
the source.
It will be immediately seen that in the case of a DNA exclusion
P(EIS) equals zero, which means the ratio of probabilities, conventionally called the likelihood ratio, is zero, and the odds that the defendant was the source of the evidence DNA is zero regardless of how
likely it appeared beforehand that the defendant was the source.
Hence acquittals based on DNA evidence alone are justified.
This, however, assumes that one can be confident about an exclusion. Since an apparent exclusion might be attributable to various
kinds of measurement error or DNA contamination, in practice
P(EIS) will never be precisely zero and to conclude that the defendant
is not the source of the evidence DNA and so deserves to be acquitted
risks the danger of a mistaken exclusion, a risk that increases with the
prior odds on S. Thus the stronger the case against a defendant, the
less the weight that should be given to a DNA exclusion.34
34 The FBI estimates that in slightly more than one third of the DNA identifications that

they have been asked to do, the result of the test is to exclude the suspect. Personal Communication from Bruce Budowle, a Research Scientist associated with the FBI's Crime Lab to
Richard Lempert and others (n.d.). This statistic should give one pause. DNA tests are presumably not ordered unless police have strong suspicion that a suspect committed a crime. If
DNA exclusions are almost always accurate, it suggests that the police frequently arrest the
wrong person. Conversely, police work may be better than it appears, and DNA testing may
be conducive to false exclusions. In one Connecticut case the prosecutor apparently thought
so, since a prosecution for rape proceeded despite a DNA exclusion and testimony by an FBI
scientist in favor of the defendant. The jury convicted, choosing to believe the victim's eyewitness identification rather than the expert testimony. See Note, DNA Typing, supra note 3, at
690 n. 104. It is possible that some DNA tests are done at the request of those who are only

under mild suspicion, such as one spouse when the other has been murdered. If it is in these
cases that DNA exclusions frequently occur, neither police work nor the accuracy of the test is
undermined by the exclusion statistics. To date no one has looked at the kinds of cases that
generate DNA exclusions and compared them to cases that yield DNA identifications.
Note also that the question of whether the defendant is the source of the evidence DNA is

19911

CAVEATS CONCERNING DNA

It is also clear from the model that the implications of a DNA
match for the probability the defendant is guilty ultimately depend on
the prior odds that defendant is the source, which will often be
thought to be the same as the prior odds that the defendant committed the allegedly criminal act. This has two important implications
that can be missed when evidence is conceived of only in frequentist
terms. First, the incriminating implications of a DNA match in the
situation where the DNA is that of a suspect is very different and
substantially greater than that of a similar match where the matched
DNA belongs to an individual who but for the match would not be a
suspect (for example, a person whose DNA profile happens to reside
in a DNA data bank). In the first instance the weight of the evidence
after the DNA identification will consist of already substantial prior
odds multiplied by some high likelihood ratio. In the second case the
prior odds on guilt will have been slight, and even after multiplication
by a substantial likelihood ratio these odds may remain relatively
small. Thus if there were no particular reason to believe that X was
any more likely to be guilty of a rape than any of one million other
adult males who lived in the vicinity of the crime, the prior odds on
X's guilt would be 1:1,000,000 and multiplication by the extremely
incriminatory likelihood ratio of 100,000 to 1 would still leave odds
on X's guilt of 1:10, odds more consistent with innocence than with
guilt. On the other hand, if other evidence suggested that there was a
fifty-fifty chance that X was guilty, or odds of 1:1, the same DNA test
would leave posterior odds on guilt of 100,000:1, far more than is
needed for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, if jurors reason in anything like a Bayesian fashion, evidence already captured in the prior odds should not be replicated in
the likelihood ratio, or else the final odds on guilt will be exaggerated
by double counting. This can occur in the ordinary case because the
equation as presented is somewhat misleading. Evidence does not
present itself to the jury, but is presented by individuals as expert witnesses. The police in furnishing laboratories with DNA evidence
often include information about the case against the suspect. If the
not the same as the question of whether the defendant is guilty of a crime. A defendant may
leave no trace of DNA evidence in circumstances where because other evidence suggests the
defendant's guilt, one would give high prior odds that the defendant is the source of the DNA
found (e.g., a rape in which there is substantial evidence that the defendant is the rapist, but
unknown to anyone the victim had intercourse with another person before the attack and the
defendant rapist wore a condom). This is another reason why one should not regard a DNA
exclusion as meaning that an acquittal is necessarily required. Conversely, the defendant may
be the source of crime scene DNA although he is innocent of the crime. (E.g., a blood stain on
the ground may have been left by someone who picked up a knife, accidentally cut himself, and
then fled when after spotting a body he realized the knife was a murder weapon.)
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expert's judgment regarding the existence and probative value of a
DNA match is influenced by her knowledge of other incriminatory
information, the jury's estimate of the incriminatory weight of the
DNA evidence will be inappropriately high. If the incriminatory evidence that influences the expert is also given the jury, this evidence
will be double counted, once explicitly for what it is worth and once
unknowingly as part of the DNA evidence.3 5 If the other evidence is
not given the jury; for example, if it were the fruits of an illegal
search, the jury will nonetheless be considering it when it gives weight
to the DNA evidence.
There is an irony here. An expert's judgment of a match is likely
to be more accurate if the expert knows and is influenced by other
evidence that the suspect is guilty, 36 but an expert's judgment that is
so influenced is likely to be misweighed by the jury. Moreover, an
expert who is familiar with the evidence against the defendant and is
influenced by this familiarity in calling or not calling a DNA match is
presenting, under the guise of DNA testimony, a judgment that no
expert is allowed to give; namely, a judgment on the probative value
of scientific and unscientific evidence taken together. While the expert might claim that her knowledge of other incriminatory information would not influence her evaluation of the DNA evidence, so long
as experts are human, such complete discounting is likely to be impossible wherever the DNA evidence is sufficiently ambiguous to allow
conflicting interpretations.3 7 Thus there should be a general rule that
35 Even if the evidence the DNA expert is aware of and influenced by is not presented
explicitly to the jury it may be double counted, for jurors may begin with prior probabilities of
guilt that are based on the assumption that the defendant would not be in court if the police
did not possess incriminating evidence not (or not yet) known to them.
36 For example, suppose an expert in a rape case is confronted with an apparent nonmatch
but is not certain whether she can rule out the possibility of band shifting. If she knew that the
suspect was found with a watch and other jewelry taken from the victim in the course of the
rape and that the defendant had confessed to the crime when he was arrested, she would be
more likely to perceive band shifting and a possible match than if she did not know this. See
infra note 47. Moreover, testimony that the DNA matched or that the analysis was inconclusive is more likely to be correct than testimony that the DNA did not match. Yet if, but for
her knowledge of the case, she would have testified that the DNA did not match, testimony
that the DNA matched or that tests were inclusive, reports not a scientific judgment but the
expert's opinion that viewing the DNA evidence in light of what the police told her, the suspect must be guilty. Moreover, the evidence that shaped the expert's testimony might be inadmissible at trial because the defendant's rights were violated in the process of acquiring it.
While some might applaud allowing expert testimony to be shaped in this fashion as a way of
getting around exclusionary rules they think silly, circumventing the rule in this way is constitutionally inappropriate.
37 See, e.g., R. NISBET-F & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980) (especially ch. 8 on Theory Maintenance and Theory
Change).
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those who do DNA testing should not know what other evidence in-

criminates a suspect; indeed, until a judgment on the DNA has been
reached, DNA analysts should not know the identity of the case in
which they are involved or the side that has requested the test. This

does not mean, however, that such experts should be deprived of all
information pertaining to the crime. Some information, such as the
number of assailants in a rape case, is needed by the expert to prop-

erly test the DNA and to interpret test results. Such information
must be provided.

The danger of double counting is also an important reason why
prosecutions based on matches with DNA found in DNA repositories

pose special dangers of false convictions. If the DNA evidence is
presented to the jury, it is likely to be assumed that it is cumulative of
prior evidence that identified the defendant as a suspect rather than

that it is the source of suspicion. Even if by the time of trial there is
other evidence that the defendant is guilty, such as an eyewitness
identification, it may be that the other evidence is "contaminated" by
the DNA evidence, as it would be, for example, if an eyewitness
learned that the person he/she was called upon to identify had been

fingered by DNA evidence.3 8 Thus where a person has become a suspect because evidence DNA matched his DNA in a data bank, evidence of that match should not be admitted unless, as with fingerprint
evidence, the chances of the evidence DNA belonging to anyone else

are minute.3 9 If the jury is given the DNA evidence that generated
suspicion, the evidence may well be misweighed and there is a nontrivial danger of a mistaken conviction if the other evidence in the
case cannot by itself support a finding of guilt.' °
38 Even if the eyewitness did not know about the DNA match a contamination effect
would be likely to exist since the defendant would probably be one of a small number of people
presented to the witness as suspects, and considerable evidence suggests that eyewitnesses may
be prone to identify. suspects in suspect-absent situations. See, e.g., E. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY (1979); E. LoFrus & K. KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE (1991); Lindsay, Wells & O'Connor, Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses, 13 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1989).
39 This will often be unlikely in the case of a data bank match. See infra note 90 and
accompanying text. If the evidence DNA and suspect DNA are matched at different loci than
those that led to the data bank match, the probative value of the DNA evidence can be
substantial.
40 A special problem is posed by the fact that most DNA data registry proposals seek to
include only those with criminal records, often for types of crimes, like rape, in which DNA
evidence is likely to be used. The criminal record is itself likely to figure in some way as
evidence against the accused (even if it leads only to spoliation inferences from the defendant's
failure to take the stand for fear that the past conviction would be revealed), and it too is a
reason why the defendant was eligible for suspicion. Putting aside civil liberties and cost concerns, a good case can be made that if DNA data bases are to be maintained, they should not
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Implications of the Likelihood Ratio

Turning now to the likelihood ratio, we see that the probative
value of DNA evidence depends on the ratio of the probability that
we would find the DNA evidence if the defendant were the source of
the DNA, to the probability that we would find that same evidence if
the defendant were not the source. If, for example, we had examined
a monomorphic allele, 41 the ratio would be one, and the evidence, as
our intuition tells us, would have no probative value and so would be
irrelevant in deciding whether the defendant were the source of the
evidence DNA. When a polymorphic allele is examined and there is a
match, the likelihood ratio will exceed one, thus increasing the odds
we would place on the defendant's guilt. The degree to which the
odds are increased depends on the frequency with which the specific
allele is found in the relevant suspect population. It is this case, that
of a matching polymorphic allele, which I shall focus on here.
First, notice that while it is convenient to think that if the defendant is the source of the evidence sample the probability of a
match is one, this is not precisely the case because the probability in
question is not the probability that the defendant's DNA is the same
as the DNA in the evidence sample but is instead the probability that
a match will be reported. However, given that a match has been reported, we shall for expository purposes treat this probability for the
moment as one and focus our attention on the denominator, the
probability that a match will be reported if the defendant is not the
source of the evidence DNA.
Our first estimate of this latter probability is the population base
rate frequency for the combination of alleles in question. The base
rate tells us the probability that a person randomly selected from the
population will have the same DNA profile as that of the evidence
sample and the defendant. One must, however, define the population
from which a hypothetical person should be randomly chosen. DNA
laboratories currently use convenience samples42 which they regard as
representative, with respect to the alleles probed, of Caucasians,
Blacks, or Hispanics generally. But the appropriate population is, as
we have seen, not the general population but the population of possibe limited to those convicted of certain crimes but should be as extensive as can be
accommodated.
41 A monomorphic allele is an allele that does not vary from person to person. Thus the
fact that an evidence sample and a suspect sample share such an allele does not serve to distinguish the suspect from anyone else who might have committed the crime.
42

The FBI laboratory's Caucasian data base was, for example, originally based on the

analysis of blood samples taken from FBI agents, and other laboratories have typed blood
samples from blood banks to establish their reference data bases.

1991]

CAVEATS CONCERNING DNA

ble suspects. This will often mean a population composed of people
who are of the same race as the defendant, who are of the same gender
as the defendant, and who live in the same area as the defendant. The
use of generalized population data bases are, strictly speaking, proper
only if it is reasonable to suppose that, with respect to the alleles
probed, both the suspect population and the sample that makes up the
data base are essentially random subsets of the same larger population. If this is not the case, the expert will misevaluate the probative
value of a match. I have already pointed to the problems posed by
both population substructure and the likely presence of relatives in
the suspect population.43 These problems mean that when current
data bases are used to determine the denominator of the likelihood
ratio, the danger of misleading the jury cannot be dismissed."
The denominator of the likelihood ratio also depends on the standard that is used to declare a match. The more generous the standard, the more likely it is that a match will be declared even when the
defendant is not the source of the DNA. If the standard used to declare a match (e.g., within N standard deviations) is not the same as
the standard used to categorize allele frequency in the population data
base, use of the data base figures will be inappropriate and may distort
the likelihood ratio by an order of magnitude.45
The Bayesian model suggests that as a general matter the population base rate, even if accurate, is likely to be a somewhat low estimate
of the probability that evidence of a match would exist if the defendant were not the source of the evidence DNA. This is because in
certain circumstances a match would be reported46 where a match
was not apparent; namely where nonmatching bands were attributed
to band shifting 47 or other analytic problems.48 Given that a match
43 See supra notes 9-21 and accompanying text.
44 But see studies cited. infra note 76. It may well be that a match is so improbable that an
exaggerated picture of its improbability caused by an inappropriate data base does not prejudice a defendant because the true probability would have been more than enough to persuade a
jury that the defendant was the source of the evidence sample. Moreover, even if the defendant belongs to an ethnic group with alleles distributed quite differently from those in the laboratory's reference data base, this is unlikely to lead to a serious underestimate of the
probability that a random person left the evidence DNA unless a number of individuals belonging to the same ethnic group are also members of the suspect population.
45 One might think that no forensic laboratory would make such a mistake where a person's life or liberty was at stake, but it has happened. See Lander, DNA Fingerprintingon
Trial, 339 NATURE 501 (1989).
46 Remember it is the reporting of a match, not the fact of a match, that is the evidence in
the case. The reporting is only fallible evidence of the fact of a match.
47 Band shifting occurs when DNA fragments in one lane of a gel migrate at a different
rate than identical fragments in other lanes of the same gel. Thus the DNA from the evidence
sample may have moved a greater distance than the DNA in the suspect sample even though
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has been reported, unless it is absolutely certain that a particular distortion of a true match has occurred, the probability of the reported
match if the defendant is not the source of the evidence sample is no
longer the frequency of the configuration of matched alleles in the
population. It is that frequency plus the frequency of the configuration of alleles apparently found and the frequency of any other alleles
which, had they been found, would have been interpreted as a
match.4 9 This number may be difficult or impossible to estimate and
is perhaps best treated as a further reason for conservatism in estimatthey have the same source. Where bands in the evidence and suspect lanes would match but
for a degree of displacement common to the alleles probed, forensic experts have sometimes
called a match or declared a marked difference in migration inconclusive despite the apparent
difference in the size of the evidence and suspect alleles. There are ways to check for band
shifting by including monomorphic alleles, which are known to be the same size across persons, in the analysis.
48 For an excellent discussion of those aspects of DNA analysis that may make the existence of a match ambiguous see Thompson & Ford, The Meaning of a Match: Sources ofAmbiguity in the Interpretation of DNA Prints, in FORENSIC DNA TECH. ch. 7 (M. Farley & J.
Harrington eds. 1991).
49 In other words if a match would be reported if two alleles matched precisely or if each
allele in the evidence lane of the gel were displaced precisely the same distance from the alleles
in the suspect lane, the probability of a match being reported if the defendant were not the
source of the suspect DNA would be the probability that a random person would have alleles
precisely matching the evidence DNA plus the probability that he would have any two alleles
measurable by the test, and displaced the same amount give or take measurement error, from
the alleles in the evidence DNA. Moreover, to pursue still further the implications of allowing
claims of matches in situations like band shifting where there is displacement of the DNA
across lanes, an implication of the Bayesian analysis is that even when there is a precise match
the frequency associated with the match should be the frequency of the allele in question in an
appropriate population plus the frequency of all other alleles that would have led the testifying
expert to call a match despite disparities. This is the case because before the test is conducted
this is the probability that the expert will report matching alleles if the suspect did not leave
the evidence sample. For this reason discrepancies attributed to band shifting or contamination should never be regarded as more than inconclusive unless scientifically valid procedures
indicate conclusively that displacement in precisely the degree observed has occurred. Indeed,
except to counter a spoliation inference (e.g., a jury belief that if DNA evidence was not
presented by the state there must have been an exclusion), the Bayesian model suggests that
DNA testimony should not be admitted where results are inconclusive unless the expert can
give the jury a reliable estimate of the relative probabilities of exclusion and inclusion. If such
probabilities cannot be given, and at the moment they cannot, a jury might well believe that
inconclusive means that there is a fifty-fifty chance that the defendant left the evidence DNA.
Such a belief can have substantial incriminatory value.
Note finally that the numerator of the likelihood ratio is also affected when there is no
actual match between the evidence and the suspect samples and the deviations from a match
are attributed to analytic or test problems. In these circumstances unless absolute confidence
in the explanation for the deviation exists (i.e., the conditions of the analysis are such that one
knows for certain that if the suspect and evidence DNA are the same there would be the
deviation between the two samples that was found), the probability that there would be a
"match" with the deviations found if the defendant were the source of the evidence DNA will
be less than one, thus lowering the likelihood ratio even without taking into account denominator effects.
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ing allele frequencies in the first instance and as a reason not to call a
match unless a match is apparent.
B.

The Implications of Error

It is obvious that both the numerator and denominator of the
likelihood ratio may be affected by any laboratory procedures that
allow for error, with the result that the likelihood ratio, which is to
say the probative value of the evidence, will diminish. Possible
sources of error include sloppy laboratory procedures, the materials
used, the quality of the evidence DNA, and the protocols used for
calling a match. 0 Moreover, any information that influences the calling of a match apart from the physical evidence of the autorads can
have a similar effect. Thus laboratory failures may lead to both mistaken exclusions and false positives. Other kinds of failures may pose
a threat of only one kind of error. Thus if an analyst is influenced in
calling a match by knowing whether it is a prosecutor or defense
counsel who has submitted the sample, false positives or mistaken exclusions, but not both, would become more likely.5 1
What may be less obvious is how serious the implications of error
are for the kinds of probability statements that are often given by
prosecution experts in DNA cases. Recall that in the Bayesian model
as presented the numerator of the likelihood ratio was P(EIS) and the
denominator was P(Enot-S), in which E stood for evidence of a
match between the evidence and suspect samples and S was the fact
that the defendant was the source of the DNA evidence sample. But
it is not the fact of a DNA match that is presented at trial; rather it is
testimony that a DNA match in fact exists. 52 Yet witnesses testifying
about the probability of (Elnot-S), which is to say the probability that
the DNA came from someone other than the defendant, present
figures that are based not on the likelihood that a match would be
reported if the defendant were not the source of the evidence sample
but rather on the likelihood that the DNA would in fact match if the
defendant were not the source of the evidence sample. The latter figure can be tiny indeed; figures smaller than one in fifty billion have
been presented at trials.5 3 The former figure, that is the likelihood
50 For a review of these sources of error, see Thompson & Ford, supra note 3; Thompson &
Ford, supra note 48.
51 The possibility of such influences is an important reason why visual matching should not

by itself be sufficient to call a match. There should be some objective check on visual matches
or, indeed, objective matching in the first instance. Current "objective" systems allow the
analyst to override the machine settings.
52 Cf Lempert, supra note 33, at 1052-55.
53 Note that critiques like those made above, see supra text accompanying notes 11-25, and
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that a match would be reported if the defendant were not the source
of the evidence sample, can never be less than the false positive rate of
the laboratory examining the DNA in question.
Forensic experts often present their findings with great confidence, but infallibility is unfortunately not a characteristic of forensic
laboratories.5 4 In one study in which samples of known materials
were sent to a number of forensic laboratories, error rates were as
high as seventy percent 55 Another study reports crime laboratory error rates as high as seventy-seven percent.5 6 While labs doing DNA
testing have done better than this in the limited blind proficiency testing that has occurred, they are still far from perfect. In the only
blind DNA tests" reported in the literature, the three major commercial laboratories then doing forensic DNA testing were sent fifty samples each. Two of the three declared one false match. In a second set
of tests the year following, one company declared a false match. 8
Nor have false positive errors been confined to tests in which no one's
fate was at stake. Eric Lander, for example, describes a case in which
one of the major commercial laboratories reported that a woman was
the mother of an apparently abandoned newborn; later it turned out
that the woman was pregnant with another child at the time the abandoned newborn was discovered.59 In another case a second major
commercial laboratory compared two blood samples from the same
alleged rapist and declared they did not match, thus supporting the
prosecutor's contention that in providing the first blood sample,
by others who have examined the forensic use of DNA suggest that such figures are far smaller

than can be justified (see, e.g., Thompson & Ford, supra note 3; Lander, supra note 9), but the
argument here proceeds on the assumption that such figures are accurate estimates of the
likelihood of a purely coincidental match.
54 See, e.g., Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J. OF L. & TECH.
109 (1991).
55 J. PETERSON, E. FABRICANT & K. FIELD, CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING RESEARCH PROGRAMS: FINAL REPORT 251 (Table 89) (1978).
56 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GENETIC WITNESS FORENSIC

UsES OF DNA TESTS 79 (July 1990) [hereinafter GENETIC WITNESS] (interview with B.

Grunbaum and C. Moraga). Other studies in this report quote more modest error rates, in one
case as low as 2.4%, or 1.3% if the laboratories making more than three errors are eliminated.
Some of the discrepancy in error rates between studies is apparently attributable to how error
is defined, for example, whether inconclusive results are defined as error.
57 The tests were not fully blind. While the laboratories did not know whether samples
sent matched, they did know these were test samples. The one lab that declared no false
matches on the test, apparently had its researchers run the DNA tests rather than the technicians that usually performed them. Note, DNA Profiling, supra note 3, at 493. Another lab
was allowed to withdraw a report with several errors and submit one with only one error after
its representative met with the testing committee. Thompson & Ford, supra note 48, at 144
n.122.
58 GENETIC WITNESS, supra note 56, at 79-80.
59 Lander, supra note 45, at 505.
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which resulted in an exclusion, the suspect had substituted a third
party's blood for his own. It took a third test, insisted on by the suspect, to show that the second laboratory had made a mistake and that
he could not have been the rapist.'
Yet analysts from the same labs that made these errors (perhaps
the same analysts) will report matches and confidently tell the jury
that the probability of such a match if the defendant was not the
source of the evidence sample is less than one in many billion. In fact,
to judge by the proficiency test results, the probability that the jury
would be told of such a match if the defendant were not the source of
the sample is closer to one in fifty or one in a hundred.
The probability of a reported match if the suspect did not leave
the evidence DNA is greater than a laboratory's false positive rate
because in addition to the possibility of error there is also the possibility that the DNA was left by someone other than the defendant.
However, the latter probability is usually dwarfed by the probability
of a false positive error; so this apparently crucial probability, which
is at the center of most disputes about the admissibility of DNA testimony, may ordinarily be safely ignored! Indeed, jurors provided with
a laboratory's false positive rate and with information about the likelihood, assuming no testing error, of a match if the evidence DNA was
not the defendant's, are likely to be hopelessly confused about the
weight to accord the testimony because ordinary people are not very
good at working with conditional probabilities.6 Thus jurors ordinarily should receive only the laboratory's false positive rate as an estimate of the likelihood that the evidence DNA did not come from the
defendant.62
6 Id.
61 See, e.g., Schum & Martin, supra note 32.
62 Only when the characteristics of the evidence DNA are so common that the likelihood it
could have been left by a random individual is close to or exceeds the false positive rate should
jurors be informed of this probability because only then will the probability of matching a
random member of the suspect population be sufficiently close to the error rate that knowing
this rate will appreciably increase the likelihood of a false match beyond what it would appear
to be from knowledge of the false positive rate alone.
Where the random match probability is of this magnitude, the statistic should not be
presented to the jury alone. Rather it should be added to the false positive rate. The resulting
statistic will inform the jurors of the likelihood that a DNA match would be reported when the
defendant was not the source of the evidence DNA. It is this statistic that specifies the weight
that should be given the DNA evidence.
After a draft of this section of the article was completed, I learned that my basic point
about the implications of laboratory error rates had been made by Paul Hagerman in a letter to
the American Journalof Human Genetics, Hagerman, DNA Typing in the ForensicArena, 47
AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 876 (1990). Hagerman's argument was implicitly accepted in another
letter to that journal by Russel Higuchi, a scientist who works for one of the labs that has been
a pioneer in forensic DNA testing. R. Higuchi, Human Error in Forensic DNA Typing, 48
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Estimating the appropriate false positive rate for a DNA test is
no simple matter.63 Ideally, false positive rates should be specific to
6
the laboratory, the analyst, and the quality of the DNA examined. '
We cannot get such data. Typically the best evidence of the likely
laboratory error rate is the error rate revealed by blind proficiency
testing, which might be thought of as an average error rate over a
nonrandom subsample of the kinds of cases the laboratory is likely to
encounter. Moreover, even at the laboratory level, blind proficiency
testing might be inadequate to estimate risks of error. 6 DNA testing
is expensive and time consuming; thus each lab is likely to be subject
to a relatively small number of blind tests in a given year. If a laboratory error rate is, for example, 1 in 500, which would reflect extraordinary accuracy in most kinds of forensic analysis, the error rate
is still likely to be orders of magnitude larger than the frequency estimates that the laboratory would put on the possibility that a match
would have been reported had the DNA come from someone other
than the defendant. Yet with an error rate as low as 1 in 500, many
AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1215 (1991). Hagerman demonstrates that the probability of a false
match is essentially independent of the population frequency when the laboratory error rate is
much larger than the frequency of a given band pattern in the general population. Contrary to
my argument in the text, Hagerman suggests that the laboratory false positive rate be added to
the estimated frequency rate as a matter of routine. Hagerman concurs with my suggestion in
the text at note 64 infra that DNA samples should be split and independently analyzed. He
also cautions, as I do in note 63 infra, against the danger of mistaken exclusions.
63 1 am focusing on false positive rates because these rates are at issue in determining the
probative value of the DNA evidence that prosecutors seek to introduce. However, prosecutors deciding on whether to drop cases or judges and jurors evaluating evidence of a DNA
exclusion must concern themselves with false negative rates, and these are probably higher
than the incidence of false positives. False negative rates are a special concern because if the
DNA from two sources differs, random analytical errors are unlikely to result in the appearance of a match, but if the DNA from two sources is the same, random errors caused by
degradation or analytical mistakes are likely to result in the appearance of a nonmatch.
64 Laboratories vary with respect to such matters as the loci they probe, the quality of their
statistical data bases, the procedures and standards they use to declare a match, and the care
that is taken to prevent the contamination of one sample of DNA with another. Analysts vary
in their skill and in the way they resolve ambiguous cases. Some evidence samples contain
DNA in large quantities in good condition while other samples are smaller or degraded and
contaminated in various ways. And some alleles that do not match are close in size while
others are quite different. The interaction of these factors means that the likelihood of false
positives cannot be expected to be constant across laboratories or within laboratories across
analysts and cases analyzed.
65 Even conducting a truly blind proficiency test may pose difficulties. If, for example,
DNA samples are typically sent to laboratories by the police along with summaries of other
evidence in the case, test samples should include summaries which report incriminating information with about the same detail that police summaries usually do. If DNA samples contain
the number of a contact person who can be called for further information about the case, blind
samples should also give the number of a contact person who must be available to discuss the
"case" if called. Test samples should also be degraded in varying degrees to match the degrees
of degradation that are found in actual casework.
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years might pass before an error occurred in a blind test.6 Thus unless forensic laboratories have uncomfortably high error rates, the primary virtue of blind proficiency testing is not that it allows error rates
to be estimated. Rather, this virtue is that knowing that any sample
analyzed may be a test is an incentive for quality control in all tests
the laboratory runs.

One response to the possibility of laboratory error and the limits
it should place on the weight accorded DNA matches is to standard-

ize and improve technology and training to lower error rates substantially. This is of course desirable, but so long as humans are involved
in the identification process, it is utopian to expect error rates that will
not dwarf the probabilities that could be associated with reported
DNA matches in an error-free world. Thus in this world, proficiency
testing, licensing and other such palliatives are not enough. Instead,

whenever possible DNA should be sent to two or, better yet, three
laboratories for independent analysis. Since most of the sources of
false positives are independent across laboratories,67 laboratory error
rates could be multiplied to give the possibility that all laboratories

reporting a match are mistaken, and either this figure or the
probability of a random match, whichever is greater, could be given to
the jury as the probability that a match would be reported when
someone other than the defendant left the evidence sample. 6 If, for
example, each of three testing laboratories had a false positive rate of
1 in 100 the probability that three laboratories would all mistakenly

call a match is about one in one million.69 It is expensive to send
DNA to two or three labs for separate analysis, but if prosecutors

wish to present jurors with the overwhelming numbers that make
66 An error rate of I in 500 is not small when the failure to recognize this will lead a jury to
conclude that the probability of a mistaken identification is less than one in a billion. Yet it is
small if the issue is the likelihood that an error will occur in a blind proficiency test when a lab
is tested on, for example, only 10 or 20 samples a year.
67 From this perspective it is a good rather than a bad thing that the leading laboratories
use different probes and have different data bases.
68 If the figures were similar in magnitude, error from both possibilities should be considered in setting a probability for the jury. This can be done, as Hagerman, supra note 62, points
out by summing the two probabilities and reporting the sum to the jury.
Note that the probability of a false positive and the probability that a random person left
the evidence DNA are not the same in their implications. The latter probability but not the
former has implications for estimating the number of members of the suspect population who
might have left the evidence DNA. If the false positive rate is thought to be the same as the
"random match" probability there may be a particular danger of making the "defense attorney's fallacy." Thompson & Schumann, supra note 7, at 171.
69 Actually, the combined false positive rate is probably somewhat greater because certain
sources of error might inhere in the sample or be common to all laboratories.
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prosecutors so enamored of DNA evidence,7 0 either laboratories must
demonstrate they perform virtually without error 7 1 or multiple testing
7 2

must occur.

C.

The Value of A One Allele Match

One final implication of the Bayesian model is that the probative
value of even limited evidence may be surprisingly large. Thus in a
situation where only one allele is tested, if there is a match between
the evidence DNA and the defendant's DNA and if the population
base rate for the matched allele is accurately assessed at 1 in 100, the
evidence would mean that a juror's prior odds on guilt should be multiplied 100 fold after receipt of the DNA evidence. This could easily
change a situation in which the apparent balance of the probabilities
went from one which suggested that the defendant was not guilty, to
odds that justified the conclusion that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet our intuition suggests that on the basis
of one match this would be an unreasonable leap.
There are two reasons why our intuition may be correct even
though the Bayesian implications are not wrong. The first is that as a
psychological matter jurors are likely to have unreasonably high prior
odds. Thus people who do not know whether or not a defendant is
guilty often give initial odds on guilt of 1:1 or fifty-fifty. In fact the
odds should be one to whatever number of people make up the suspect population. Thus, multiplying prior odds, properly understood,
by a number as small as one hundred is still likely to leave it far more
likely than not that reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt remains.
Second, there is the so-called spoliation issue; that is the implications of what is absent from evidence. If a person were only presented
with the information that one of the defendant's alleles matched one
allele in the evidence DNA, she would wonder about the other alleles
70 Subject to the caveats about micro populations, see supra notes 11-27 and accompanying
text.
71 In the context of DNA evidence, virtually without error means that error rates must be
the same low order of magnitude as the frequencies associated with the probability of a random match.
72 To some extent the more alleles tested by a single laboratory, the more confident we can

be of the accuracy of a reported match across all alleles. Certain errors might affect only the
measurement of certain alleles, and the fact that a number of other alleles match may be such
good evidence that the suspect and evidence samples came from the same source that we are
justified in disregarding the possibility that the claim that a particular pair of alleles match is in
error. Other mistakes, however, such as contamination of the evidence lane with suspect
DNA, will yield false matches no matter how many alleles are tested. Until large numbers of
blind proficiency tests occur without error and proven errors cease to be found in tried cases,
we must assume error rates many orders of magnitude larger than the random match
probabilities often reported by DNA analysts.
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tested and why evidence about them had not been presented. The
suspicion would be that evidence of the other alleles was exonerative

or that there was a fear that if further testing was conducted the results would be exonerative. If this concern is reasonable, the conclusion that one matching allele does not justify increasing the estimated
prior odds on guilt one hundredfold would be justified unless some

good reason could be given why it was impossible to test for more
than one allele. If it were impossible to test for more than one allele
and the one allele that could be tested for did match, this would be
relevant evidence, and so long as it was unlikely to.confuse a jury, it
should be admitted.
D.

The Number Of Alleles To Test

Closely related to the issue of the evidential implications of one-

allele matches is the issue of how many alleles should be tested to
determine whether evidence and suspect DNA match.7 a Currently it

appears that three or four loci which may yield as many as six or eight
different alleles are ordinarily probed. The adequacy of this number
depends not only on the population frequencies of the alleles identified

but also on the validity of the assumptions of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium 74 and linkage equilibrium 7 and on the costs of erroneous
judgments. Not only are the equilibrium assumptions questionable,76
73 The discussion that follows assumes that my suggestion that the DNA probability evidence be limited by false positive rates will not be followed. If it is, the error rate will impose a
limit on the probability associated with a reported match that cannot be substantially lowered
by testing more alleles. (But see supra note 72.) However, testing more alleles may still be
justified in that it gives a higher probability of finding true exclusions. Of course the
probability of reporting a false exclusion increases as well.
74 The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium assumption justifies treating the two alleles a person
possesses at each locus as independently distributed for the purpose of determining their joint
probability.
75 The linkage-equilibrium assumption justifies treating alleles at different loci on different
chromosomes as independently distributed for purposes of determining their joint probability,
or so the term is used in much of the writing on the forensic use of DNA. However, in the
field of genetics, linkage, strictly speaking, refers to the association of genes on a single chromosome. See definition of linkage disequilibrium in R. KING & W. STANSFIELD, A DICTIONARY OF GENETICS 181 (4th ed. 1990). Population substructure, for reasons apart from
linkage, may mean that within a larger population the assumption that alleles on different
chromosomes are independently distributed will not hold. See, e.g., Walsh & Buckelton,
supra, note 21.
76 See the sources cited supra at notes 3, 9. There is considerable dispute over how robust
estimates of DNA band pattern frequencies are to the empirical violation of these equilibrium
assumptions. Contrast the articles noted above with Budowle, Giusti, Waye, Baechtel,

Fourney, Adams, Presley, Deadman & Monson, Fixed-Bin Analysis for Statistical Evaluation
of Continuous Distributionsof Allelic Datafrom VNTR Loci,for Use in Forensic Comparisons,
48 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 841 (1991) [hereinafter Budowle]; Devlin, Risch & Roeder, No
Excess of Homozygosity at Loci Usedfor DNA Fingerprint,249 Sci. 14i6 (1990); Evett & Gill,
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but testing laboratories do not ordinarily adjust the number of
matches they test for on the basis of the costs of false positives. A
good case can be made that such adjustment should occur, and that at
least where an identification that might lead to the death penalty is
involved an additional locus or two should be tested because of the
potential costs of error." Indeed, it might make sense to establish a
standard that provides that for DNA evidence to be admissible, if the
amount of available DNA permits, a minimum number of probes
must be used and a certain low probability of random inclusion must
be reached. The lower the probability of random inclusion, the less
difficulty a jury should have in weighing the information. This too
might argue for the testing of more alleles than is conventionally
done.78
E. PresentingDNA Evidence
Finally, we come to the question of whether the statistics of
DNA evidence should be presented in Bayesian rather than frequentist terms. Finkelstein and Fairley have argued that statistically-based
identification evidence should as a general matter be presented in a
Bayesian format,79 and Evett and Werrett have extended this argument to DNA identification evidence in particular.8 " Many conventionally trained forensic scientists would, no doubt, argue against this
proposition.
One common argument against-that juries would have difficulties in understanding Bayesian presentations-may be less substantial
than it appears. Jurors have difficulties understanding any statistical
A Discussion of the Robustness of Methods for Assessing the Evidential Value of DNA Single

Locus Profiles in Crime Investigations, 12 ELECTROPHORESiS 226 (1991); Jeffreys, Turner &
Debenham, The Efficiency of Multilocus DNA Fingerprint Probes for Individualization and Establishment of Family Relationships, Determined From Extensive Casework, 48 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 824 (1991). For a suggestion that the implications of Budowle, supra, and Jeffreys,
Turner & Debenham, supra, are limited, see Lander, Invited Editorial: Research on DNA Typing Catching Up With Courtroom Application, 48 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 819 (1991).
77 Alternatively, and even wiser for reasons specified here and in the text at note 67 supra,
where the stakes are life and death, a suspect's DNA should be sent to different laboratories for
analysis at different loci.
78 With the RFLP technique the number of alleles that might be tested will be limited by
the amount of evidence DNA. It may be that this amount is insufficient to allow testing at
more than four, or even as many as four, loci. Also there are competing uses for available
DNA. Defendants, for example, may wish to be able to run their own DNA tests, or one
laboratory's tests may be replicated to check for error. (If the confirming laboratory used
different alleles, a reported match would not only be reason to downgrade the possibility of
error, but it would also increase substantially the probability that the defendant was uniquely
identified, assuming no error.)
79 Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2.
80 Evett & Werrett, supra note 30.
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presentation of evidence, and to date there is no good evidence which
suggests they have more trouble understanding the implications of
Bayesian than of frequentist perspectives."1 Indeed, since the Bayesian presentation is directed to the question the jury must resolve,
jurors might find a Bayesian presentation of DNA statistics more intuitively comprehensible than a frequentist statement.
The need to estimate prior odds to evaluate the probative value
of the evidence presents, however, a more formidable problem. Evett
and Werrett seek to avoid the problem by arguing for a convention
whereby a jury would be told that the evidence weakly supports a finding of identity when the likelihood ratio is no greater than ten, that it
supports the finding when the ratio is between 10 and 100, that it
strongly supports the conclusion when the ratio is between 100 and
1,000 and that it very strongly supports it when the ratio is greater
than 1,000. 8 2 However, this and similar conventions can be misleading because the probative implications of the likelihood ratio is inextricably linked, as we have seen, with the estimated prior odds. If the
prior odds are very small, even likelihood ratios of 1,000 or more may
yield posterior odds on identity that are substantially below fifty-fifty.
Thus if jurors are to be given Bayesian likelihood ratios, they should
also be instructed in how they might estimate prior odds and integrate
their judgments of prior odds with the probative force of the DNA
evidence as represented by its likelihood ratio."3 Whether this task
could be easily accomplished is a question that I cannot answer, but
the possibility that DNA identification evidence could be presented
more effectively in a Bayesian than a frequentist fashion deserves further exploration. Alternatively, if other evidence suggests that reasonable jurors should perceive at least a moderate prior probability of
guilt, a convention like Evett and Werret's might well be the best way
to proceed.

III.

How DOES DNA EVIDENCE MATrER?

Despite all the fuss that has been made about DNA evidence, no
81 For a review of studies dealing with the competence of jurors to evaluate statistical
evidence, see Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence? 52 LAW &

CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (Autumn 1989).
82 Evett's thinking about the appropriate verbal labels for different likelihood ratios has
changed over time. For a more recent view see I. Evett, supra note 30. The precise numbers
and labels do not matter here, for the scheme is only offered by way of example.
83 So long as the likelihood ratios for each allele are conditionally independent of the ratios
for each other allele, they may serve in turn as multipliers of the prior odds. Thus the likelihood ratios may in theory be presented sequentially or as a composite for N matches. However, it is better practice to present the composite figure, for jurors are not experts at
combining probabilities. See Schum & Martin, supra note 32.
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one knows how much it matters. While there are now numerous
cases in which DNA evidence has been introduced, this does not
mean DNA evidence matters greatly. It is important to recognize
that there are two uses to which forensic identity evidence may be
put. First, the evidence may be used to identify an otherwise unknown criminal. Second, the evidence may be used to prove that a
defendant is in fact guilty. It appears that evidence which is presented
to the jury as if it were crucial identification evidence is often important primarily as a way of proving a defendant guilty.84 Police lineups, for example, are often conducted after the police are confident
they have collared the suspect. 5 The lineup, although it seems to be a
crucial stage in the identification process, may in fact be staged largely
for its dramaturgical value. 6 The prosecutor, in other words, may be
able to present a more persuasive case with a lineup identification
than without one.
The situation may be similar with DNA; after all one must first
have a suspect before a DNA test can be ordered. 7 In how many of
these cases would the evidence that led to suspicion have been sufficient to lead a jury to convict, absent the DNA evidence? We simply
do not know. Yet the distinction is important in evaluating the danger that DNA evidence will lead to the conviction of the innocent. If
DNA evidence were used largely as a dramaturgical device in cases
that were otherwise so strong that a conviction should occur without
the DNA identification, there would be little danger to the innocent
from this new technology. In terms of the Bayesian model, the prior
probability of guilt (i.e., the probability based on other evidence in the
case) would be so high that despite the dangers of overweighing inculpatory DNA evidence there would be little prospect that overweighing would lead to injustice. If, for example, the odds on defendant's
guilt before the introduction of DNA evidence were one hundred to
one in favor, it would hardly matter whether the odds after the introduction of the DNA evidence were a reasonable fifty thousand to one
or an absurd fifty trillion to one. Either way, the defendant will be
convicted, as he would have been had the DNA evidence never been
offered. Indeed, one might see the DNA evidence in such a case as
84

For a particularly perceptive article, that states and builds on this insight, see Gross,

Loss of Innocence:.Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 395
(1987).
85
86

Id.
This is not to say that a victim's failure to identify a criminal at a lineup will necessarily

have no effect. At a minimum it is likely to lead the police and prosecutor to reevaluate the
"goods" they have on the suspect.
87 But see the English case of Regina v. Pitchfork described supra note 18.
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providing insurance that the jury would not misperceive the weight of
the non-DNA evidence and mistakenly acquit. 8
The situation is different, however, if the DNA evidence is essen-

tial to identify the defendant as the criminal. In this situation the
DNA evidence is of real as well as dramaturgical importance, for as
evidence of identity it is not redundant with other admissible evidence

on this issue. Thus if a match has been mistakenly declared, a mistaken conviction is a possible and perhaps likely result. Where DNA

evidence is used this way, attention to the caveats that I and others
have raised is essential to avoid instances of injustice.
The problem will become particularly acute as planned offender
data bases come on line, 9 and individuals are identified as criminals
on the basis of data base matches. In these circumstances there is a
substantial likelihood of misidentification. First, it is easy to forget
that the prior probability that the person identified is in fact the criminal is quite low. 90 Thus, even after a DNA match has been found, it
may be more likely than not that the individual identified did not

commit the crime. 9 ' Second, the probability that the defendant's
DNA would match the evidence DNA is not the probability that

88 Mistakes might still matter in such a case, for it is conceivable that but for a mistake a
DNA exclusion would have been observed, one that would justify an acquittal despite the
apparently high prior odds in favor of guilt. However, the higher the prior odds in favor of
guilt, the more likely it would be that a DNA exclusion was a false negative.
89 As of January 1990, at least 11 states had enacted laws to require some level of DNA
typing of convicted offenders and in other states databanking legislation had been proposed but
was not yet enacted. GENETIC WITNEss, supra note 56, at 122-24. A LEXIS search conducted
on August 23, 1991, revealed an additional eight states. (library: CODES; files: ALLCDE &
ALLALS; search term: "DNA").
90 The prior probability would be one over whatever number constitutes the suspect population. The exact figure would reflect the increased likelihood that a person convicted of the
same crime(s) as the suspect would, as compared to a person who has not been convicted of
these crimes, commit the crime in question, and, if the analysis is to be conducted at this level
of precision, an adjustment that takes account of the number of other people in the suspect
population who have been convicted of crimes and of their increased likelihood of committing
the crime in question. This figure cannot be calculated-we lack the needed information-but
one may contemplate its likely magnitude for heuristic purposes.
Note also that when an identification occurs from a databank match, the suspect population may be quite a bit larger than it ordinarily is. This is because a person whose DNA
matches evidence DNA will be treated as a suspect even if he lives so far from the crime that
he would not ordinarily have been considered a member of the suspect population. If it is
credible to believe that a suspect living at such a distance committed the crime, then all males
of an appropriate age (assuming a rape) who live within that distance should be considered as
potential members of the suspect population.
91 It may, however, be difficult for the suspect to convince a jury that the identification is
wrong, since if he testifies, and perhaps even if he does not, the jurors will learn of the crimes
that caused his DNA to be placed in the databank. The jurors are likely to be unaware of the
fact that given the way he was identified the defendant had to have had a criminal record, and
they might find this record unduly probative of guilt.
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would ordinarily be associated with the DNA match. Suppose, for
example, that the probability that a random member of the suspect
population would possess DNA matching the evidence sample is one
in a hundred thousand. If a suspect's DNA were to match the evidence DNA, the reported match would seem to be highly incriminating. But if the suspect was identified by scanning a data base that
contained information on twenty-thousand people, finding a match in
this data base, regardless of guilt, would not be surprising since there
are twenty-thousand chances that a match might be found.
Thus when a suspect is identified by matching evidence DNA to
a data base, if DNA identification evidence is to be presented at trial,
the alleles reported on should not be those originally matched but
should instead be a set of alleles located at different loci. If these too
match, the evidence is likely to be highly and properly incriminating.
But even in these circumstances one can have more confidence in the
suspect's guilt the greater the state's ability to provide other evidence
that suggests guilt. In particular, discrepant evidence, such as the fact
that the suspect does not resemble the victim's original description,
should not be lightly dismissed because it seems insubstantial when
contrasted with apparently powerful DNA evidence.
CONCLUSION

I conclude where I began. DNA evidence is a valuable tool for
solving crimes, especially rape, and for avoiding erroneous convictions. At the same time the technology for DNA identification is in
its infancy, and even as this technology matures, laboratories will
never be perfect. Thus there are caveats which counsel against overly
heavy reliance on the results of DNA testing. In particular, in cases
where the suspect and evidence samples match, the cautions that I
and others have raised counsel against presenting extremely low estimates of the probability that the evidence DNA might have come
from someone other than the defendant. Even if forensic scientists in
this country do not follow Evett's lead in analyzing the probative
value of DNA matches in a Bayesian framework,92 they might be wise
to follow his lead and translate their probabilities into the simple English terms weak, fair,good, strong, and very strong, and leave it at that.
Given laboratory error rates, micro population considerations, and
the like, a good case can be made that once the jury has been told that
92

See supra notes 30, 80. It should be pointed out, however, that Evett's Bayesian ap-

proach and his verbal conventions have to date been used only for research and not for
casework purposes. The Home Office's routine casework procedure is still match/binning with
the frequentist probabilities that go with it.
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a DNA match is very strong evidence of guilt, there is no more that
can be responsibly said. This limitation should not be viewed with
despair by prosecutors or by citizens who wish to see criminals punished. Currently we convict most of those charged with serious
crimes. With very strong DNA evidence, conviction rates can only
increase.
A POSTSCRIPT ON LEGAL ISSUES
A.

Frye or "Helpfulness"

I have talked in this paper only about the proper evaluation of
DNA evidence. By way of a postscript I shall discuss briefly two legal
issues that have confronted courts deciding whether to admit DNA
evidence. The first concerns the question of the standard the court
should apply. The two contenders are the Frye test and the so-called
"helpfulness" test of FRE 70293 and its state counterparts. Under
Frye, to be admissible, a new technique "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs." 9 4 Under FRE 702 an expert opinion should be
admitted when "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue ....
95
Courts and commentators often speak of these tests as if they are
different, with the Rule 702 test being more favorable to admissibility.
My view is that when an issue like the admissibility of DNA evidence
is first raised the two tests have, or at least should be interpreted to
have, the same meaning, a meaning close to what the Frye court expressed. When the probative value of evidence turns on questions
concerning the validity of theories, the adequacy of technologies and
the interpretation of data that are on the cutting edge of several modem sciences, scientifically naive judges are not well-equipped to determine by themselves what is from a scientific standpoint sufficiently
sound to be relied upon. Nor are judges likely to be able to decide
these matters correctly on the basis of testimony from competing expert witnesses. A solution judges sometimes adopt in this situation,
which is to treat the disagreement between experts as going to weight
rather than admissibility, has little to commend it. Jurors are likely to
93

FED. R. EvID. 702.

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
FED. R. EvID. 702 (emphasis added). Note that a revision of this rule has been proposed by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. It is currently at the "notice and
comment" stage.
94
95
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be in no better position than a judge to decide rationally between competing scientific views. Rather they are likely to be confused, which is
a reason to exclude evidence under FRE 403.96
What courts should do, even under FRE 702, is what Frye seems
to command.9 7 They should seek to determine the general consensus
in the relevant scientific community, for it is only this group of scientists that is well-equipped to assess the validity of the theories and
procedures on which the probative implications of the evidence depends. The consensus required to justify novel scientific evidence
need not, however, be universal, for there are often dissenters, even
reputable dissenters, to what is scientifically valid.9"
While the law must admit the possibility that what most scientists "know" is wrong, in deciding what is scientifically sound a court
usually can do no better than proceed on the assumption that what
scientists generally know is correct. But if there is substantial dissensus within the relevant scientific community, or if in a certain sphere
the scientists who are most expert in a matter disagree with the conclusions of other scientists, the evidence should be excluded for the
time being. Given the general adequacy of trial procedures at any
particular point in time, we should not risk overwhelming the jury
with information whose validity rests on propositions that are questioned by many knowledgeable scientists. If the skeptical scientists
are wrong, a consensus regarding where the truth lies should emerge
soon enough, and little harm is likely to occur in the meantime. Certainly the situation is not likely to be worse than the status quo ante, a
status quo that probably seemed satisfactory until the prospects of a
new scientific technique emerged. To hear some proponents sing the
praises of DNA, one would think that no rapists (except perhaps innocent ones) had been convicted before 1987. It ain't so.
Specifically with regard to DNA, it appears that the most important scientific underpinnings of DNA identification procedures pass
this proposed test. In particular there is a scientific consensus that no
two individuals except identical twins have identical DNA, and there
is a consensus that, within some margin of error, existing techniques,
96 "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

Id. 403.
97 For a case involving DNA that reaches a similar conclusion see United States v. Two
Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990).
98 Also, the scientific technique need not be in wide use. All that is necessary is that mem-

bers of the appropriate scientific community agree or would agree that the test is theoretically
justified and likely to yield valid results. Cf Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
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like the RFLP process, can determine whether DNA from two
sources matches. 99 Where the consensus breaks down is on the ade-

quacy of current data bases for determining allele frequencies in relevant populations and on the validity of the equilibrium assumptions

that justify multiplying allele frequencies together to get a frequency
for their joint distribution."°

Responding to these uncertainties, a

few courts have excluded evidence of DNA matches because of
problems with the population statistics or have admitted evidence of
DNA matches but have prevented experts from using the product
rule and equilibrium assumptions to attach extremely low probabilities to them. 1"'
B.

Weight or Admissibility

This brings me to my second point. Many courts, while recognizing that there is no scientific consensus about the data and assumptions that underlie the estimates of allele frequencies that forensic
scientists present to juries, nevertheless conclude that the product rule
99 There can never be a consensus that in a given case, techniques were accurately applied
because scientists as a community have no specific case knowledge. Thus, in cases where DNA
evidence is introduced, it is always open to the party contesting the evidence to claim that the
test was not properly run or that the test results were not properly interpreted. The textual
discussion is not intended to treat the scientific issues that can arise out of facts specific to cases
and so does not address the question of when testing deficiencies should be treated as going to
admissibility rather than to weight. I would suggest, however, that when a testing deficiency is
more likely than not to exist and when the scientific consensus is that such a deficiency, if it
existed, would invalidate the test results, such a deficiency should be seen as going to the
admissibility of the results in question. It is also possible in such circumstances that although
a test flaw would invalidate the results reported, a more conservative estimate of the results of
the test would not be invalidated. If so, the more conservative estimate should be allowed.
1oo Multiplying allele frequencies together in this way is to apply the so-called product rule
which holds that the probability of two events is equal to the product of their separate
probabilities if the two events are independently distributed. In the case of DNA, the events
are the possession of particular alleles. It is the independence of alleles and the tenability of
equilibrium assumptions that posit independence which is disputed in the literature that deals
with problems posed by population substructure. See sources cited supra notes 3, 9, 76. Despite these disputes it might well be possible to specify rules for counting and combining allele
frequencies that are sufficiently conservative so as to satisfy most population biologists and
geneticists that the frequencies they yield are a reasonable upper bound. Since such upper
bound estimates could always be lowered by testing more alleles, they would ordinarily not
prevent prosecutors from presenting impressively low estimates of the likelihood that a person
other than the defendant was the source of evidence DNA.
101 See State v. Pennell, 584 A.2d 513 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989); Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga.
278, 393 S.E.2d 436 (1990); State v. Fleming, No. 10-CR-2716 (Cook County, Ill. Cir. Ct.
March 12, 1991); Commonwealth v. Cumin, 409 Mass. 218, 565 N.E.2d 440 (1991); State v.
Jobe, No. 88903365 (Dist. Ct. Hennepin County, Minn. Sept. 16, 1990). Without entering a
holding on the issue, the Alabama Supreme Court also suggested that evidence of a DNA
match might be admissible while population frequency estimates are not. See Ex parte Perry,
No. 89-1534 (Ala. April 19, 1991) (LEXIS, States Library, Ala. File).
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may be applied to allele frequencies derived from small non-random
samples to generate extraordinarily low estimates1 2 of the probability
that someone other than the defendant left the evidence DNA and
that these estimates may be given to the jury. Courts allowing such
testimony treat the scientific disagreement about the propriety of
applying the product rule as going to weight rather than to

admissibility. 103
I believe that the courts which have decided this way are wrong.
Although there is a distinction between issues of weight and issues of
admissibility, and although many of the weaknesses that inhere in evidence are for the jury to judge after evidence has been admitted, this
is not the case with testimony reporting the weight that science would
give certain results. If there is no adequate scientific foundation for
the weight estimate, as evidenced by a substantial lack of consensus or
a contrary consensus in the relevant scientific community, the jury
cannot be assisted under FRE 702 and may be confused under FRE
403 and their state equivalents.
A hypothetical example should make this point clear. Assume a
DNA analyst had a theory that no two people, except identical twins,
had DNA that matched at the four loci his laboratory tested. As
evidence he might show that in his laboratory's data base of 600 people there were no two people who matched at all four loci. Most
scientists would agree, however, that for any current laboratory data
base, allele frequency counts guarantee that if enough people are
tested there will be people with the same alleles at four tested loci.
This does not change the fact that this testifying scientist's claim goes
only to the weight to be accorded the DNA evidence; that is, the question this testimony poses is: Should the evidence of a match be regarded as conclusive on the issue of identity or should it be given
some lesser weight, such as the weight suggested by the frequencies of
the matching bands? Nevertheless, it is, I hope, clear that even apart
102 There are a number of cases in which this probability has been estimated at less than one
to the number of people living on earth, no doubt suggesting to the jury that the defendant
must be the culprit. See, e.g., Pennell, 584 A.2d 513; State v. Horsley, 117 Idaho 920, 792 P.2d
945 (1990); State v. Lipscomb, 574 N.E.2d 1345 (Il. App. 1991); Cumin, 409 Mass. 218, 565
N.E.2d 440; State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989); People v. Shi Fu Huang, 145
Misc. 2d 513; 546 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Mandujano v. State, 799 S.W.2d 318 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1990).
103 See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990); State v. Hartvigsen,
No. 3-KN-$89-174 CR (Alaska Trial. Ct. July 26, 1990); People v. Axell, No. CR 23 911 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Ventura County, Aug. 7, 1989); Lipscomb, 574 N.E.2d 1345; State v. Brown, 470
N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1991); Smith v. Deppish, 248 Kan. 217, 807 P.2d 144 (1991); State v.
Vandebogart, No. 90-S-655, 656 (Rockingham, N.H. Super. Ct. May 7, 1991); State v.
Kalakosky, No. 88-1-00341-7 (Wash. Super. Ct. Spokane County, March 22, 1989); State v.
Cauthron, No. 88-1-01253-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Snohamish County, March 8, 1989).
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from the possibility of error this scientist after reporting a four loci
match should not be allowed to testify that it is one hundred percent
certain that the defendant was the source of the evidence sample.
The reason why this scientist should not be allowed to testify that
his findings are conclusive of identity is the obverse of the reason why
he is allowed to testify in the first instance. He is allowed to testify to
the fact of a match (where a lay person would not be) because it has
been established that he is an expert in doing DNA analyses. If he
were not properly trained or if he did not use scientifically appropriate
methods in running his tests, he would not be allowed to testify to the
existence of a match.
One might reasonably argue that deficiencies in an alleged expert's abilities and procedures affect only the weight that should be
accorded his findings and that the jurors are perfectly able to discount
flawed findings, as well they might be. But this argument does not
meet the objection. The reason the untrained witness cannot testify as
an expert is that the standards of FRE 702 or its state equivalents are
not met. If the witness lacks appropriate training, he is not qualified
as an expert, and if he did not use scientifically appropriate methods,
the jury will not be assisted by his testimony because they will have
no basis for determining what weight his testimony should be given.
The situation is the same with respect to the hypothetical scientist's
testimony about the weight that should be given a match. Again he is
allowed to testify (where a lay person would not be) because he is
thought to have the scientific knowledge needed to evaluate the probative value of a match. When it becomes clear that his knowledge is
not regarded as scientifically sound, Rule 702's permission to testify in
the form of an opinion disappears.
It does not matter that the witness can honestly claim that his
testimony goes only to the weight to be accorded a match. Indeed, for
the prosecutor to seek the scientist's testimony, knowing it is scientifically unsupported, is akin to the presentation of evidence that the
prosecutor knows for a fact is erroneous. Even if the witness testifies
in good faith, the prosecutor has acted wrongly." °
There is little difference in principle between the hypothetical scientist I have described and a witness who gives a purportedly scientific frequency estimate that is based on equilibrium assumptions' 05
104

For example, a prosecutor could not present a witness who, in good faith, would testify

to the defendant's involvement in a killing so similar to the crime charged as to be admissible

under FRE 404(b) if the prosecutor knows that at the time of the other killing the defendant
was in prison in a different state. The witness is not guilty of perjury, but from the jurors'
point of view he might just as well be, for they will be similarly misled.
105 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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and assumptions about the absence of population substructure that
are not generally accepted by those students of population structure
and genetics' ° who make up the relevant scientific community.' ° If
an expert's techniques for evaluating the existence or improbability of
a match are not regarded as sound by most scientists in the relevant
community there is no permissible basis under FRE 702 or its state
counterparts for the expert's opinion. It does not matter that the expert's testimony is only directed at the weight to be given a match. In
order to give an opinion at all, the expert must be testifying with appropriate scientific support.10 8 The existence and appropriateness of
106 As in Frye itself, there is a relevant scientific community (or communities since more
than one field is involved) apart from the community of forensic scientists doing DNA analysis. It is these nonforensic communities to which a court should turn in deciding whether
statistical probability calculations are, from a scientific standpoint, sufficiently well grounded
under Frye (or FRE 702 as I think it should be read) to be admissible. Members of these
scientific communities have testified on both sides of the population genetics issues.
107 I am assuming the lack of general acceptance I posit can be established. It is how I read
the evidence of where the scientific consensus on these issues lies, but I do not claim to be an
expert in these matters, nor to have read exhaustively in the relevant literatures. And as I
indicated supra note 76, there is some recent research that suggests that the failure of these
assumptions might not be as important in practice as it appears in theory. The question of
whether a reasonable scientific consensus exists given recent research is one that courts appear
to be well-equipped to determine in Frye or preliminary FRE 702 hearings. Given the rapid
pace of research on DNA and the development of new techniques of analysis, no jurisdiction
should be locked into holding as a matter of law that DNA evidence evaluated in a certain
fashion is always or never admissible. There should be implicit in any law or precedent in this
area the condition that the rule may always be reconsidered if it comes to be seen as scientifically unreasonable given new knowledge.
108 Where the matter relates to the weight that should be placed on a test that is scientifically well-grounded, a requirement for a scientific consensus on this issue may be too stringent
a test for admissibility under FRE 702, but if there is a general consensus in the relevant
community that'a procedure for determining weight is not scientifically justified, testimony
relying on the disapproved procedure should not be allowed. Ordinarily the relevant scientific
community will not be the forensic science community but will be composed, as in Frye, of
scientists who work in the fields in which the forensic science claims are rooted.
The arguments in the text and in this note are normative judgments and not an attempt to
summarize what courts do. In fact with respect to DNA testing courts have come out both
ways. As is clear from the cases cited supra at notes 101, 103, there are cases that have held
that disputes about how to evaluate the implications of a DNA match go to weight and that
parties can present competing evaluations to the jury; and there are cases, fewer in number,
that have held that the admissibility of estimates of the weight to be placed on DNA evidence
turns on the scientific acceptability of using the product rule and ignoring issues of population
substructure.
Some might argue that Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (holding, in the face of an
American Psychiatric Association amicus brief to the contrary, that a psychiatrist answering a

hypothetical question could predict a defendant would be dangerous) is Supreme Court precedent favoring the admissibility of expert testimony on the weight to be accorded a DNA match
even if the procedures for calculating that weight are based on assumptions and theories that

are not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, and that under Barefoot objections such as these to the scientific reliability of expert evaluations go only to weight and not
admissibility. The strong version of the argument is that in Barefoot the expert evidence that
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the claimed scientific support are matters that go to admissibility. 119
was offered (a prediction of dangerousness) was generally regarded as having no valid scientific
foundation by scientists in the relevant field and that even in these circumstances the Supreme
Court held that objections to the scientific foundation of the testimony went to weight rather
than to admissibility.
While there are dicta in Barefoot that would support this argument, the case properly
read does not. First, this was a constitutional case. The Court was only deciding whether a
Texas decision to admit the evidence violated a defendant's constitutional rights; id. at 905.
The Court was not determining the appropriate evidentiary standard for admitting such evidence. Second, the Court took great pains to suggest there was no consensus in the relevant
scientific community that dangerousness could not be predicted in the hypothetical situation
that the state's psychiatrist addressed, and the Court pointed out that the author of a study
that the defendant's expert called "excellently done" had concluded, despite his initial expectations, that in some circumstances violence could be predicted. Id. at 899 n.7. Finally, the
Court saw the situation in Barefoot as one in which it would be anomalous not to allow psychiatrists to testify because even lay opinion on future dangerousness was to be respected, id. at
897, and the issue of whether lay opinion on this issue was admissible was seen by the Court as
foreclosed by its decision in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), which held that the likelihood
that a defendant would commit further crimes was a constitutionally acceptable criterion for
imposing the death penalty.
109 It is, however, legitimate for a proponent of DNA evidence to argue that even if certain
assumptions that underlie a probability calculation are questioned in the relevant scientific
community, as a practical matter violations of these assumptions do little to affect the accuracy
of the conclusions offered. The Court should determine the validity of such arguments, paying
attention to whether they are accepted in, or accord with theories accepted in, the relevant
scientific community. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 76.

